Readers
will recognize at once that without audio recordings the
accuracy of the communications reports will be forever
kept in doubt Difficulties in understanding the
words in noisy radio transmissions was only the
beginning. Whole chapters in Amelianna
are devoted...
to the error-prone transcription
process,
to erasures and overtyping
("smoothing the reports"),
to the skills of low-ranking
operators unfamiliar with aviation's
phraseology,
to after-the-fact re-writing by
persons having a stake in investigations to come,
and
to the inevitable pilfering of
historical souvenirs from the Itasca radio
room.
With all these realities in mind, let us
take up the challenge in the Simplexity
Aloft puzzle
-- parsing the last words of Amelia Earhart (AE) as they
were reported in the ITASCA
Radio Room Transcript July 2, 1937...
0615 WANTS BEARING ON 3105
KCS / ON HOUR / WILL WHISTLE IN MIC. ABOUT
TWO HUNDRED MILES OUT // APPX // WHISTLING.
This 0615
IST transmission would have
been initiated aboard the Electra at 1745 GCT, which was in keeping
with the pre-arranged 'radio schedule'
according to which AE was supposed to
transmit simplex at quarter-to and
quarter-passed each hour.
The phraseology "WANTS
BEARING..." is in
the third person in place of what was
surely heard over-the-air in the
form of a request, "PLEASE
TAKE BEARING ON US..." (as repeated a
half-hour later at 0645
IST), thus
AE was invoking Half-Duplex RDF,
intending to obtain guidance from Itasca
('DF steer').
The "ON
3105 KCS" part
of the message may seem to be redundant
(tantamont to saying, "listen to me on
the frequency on which you are now
listening to me"), but it calls
attention to a critical issue.
Critical
Issue {1}: As mentioned in
the puzzle, three different
radio frequencies would be called out by
AE (3105, 6210, and 7500 KCPS).
The table in the puzzle shows that,
if everybody stuck to the script, those
time-slot assignments with IST =
GCT minus
11:30 ought to have worked without
conflict. Although not shown explicitly
in the puzzle,
simultaneous streams on all frequencies were
being transmitted during the time-slots
assigned to Itasca.
Solvers should take note that
in the 0615
IST transmission,
we see the phrase "ON
HOUR,"
which was a mere confirmation of the
schedule -- but only as perceived by AE.
Critical
Issue {2}: Fifteen minutes after
1745 GCT, the time on board the Electra
would read 1800 GCT, which is indeed "ON
HOUR";
however, that time would be read on
board Itasca as "0630
IST," thus on the
"half-hour."
Taken
literally, AE's request was for Itasca
to transmit the RDF bearing back to the
Electra at 0700 IST, fully 45 minutes later,
during which the Electra would have
travelled more than 100 miles on an
uncorrected heading.
The clause "WILL
WHISTLE IN MIC"
receives considerable attention in
references about the flight.
Conventional procedure for Half-Duplex
RDF is for the pilot to key his or her
microphone and count forwards then
backwards while the operator on the
ground turns his or her loop antenna to
obtain a 'null' for the bearing.
Several authors express the opinion that
AE used her voice at high pitch to
simulate an audio tone heard in Morse
Code.
The
phrase "// APPX //
WHISTLING"
probably is another case of using the
third person to describe events in the
transcript. However, we are
reminded again of something potentially
more significant.
Critical
Issue {3}: According to some
references, AE did not understand Morse
Code. Others aver that both AE and
FN were competent with radiotelegraph,
but preferred radiotelephone instead.
"ABOUT
TWO
HUNDRED MILES OUT" may be
a direct quote from AE. Given that
the Electra took off at 0000 GCT with 22
hours of fuel, we surmise that the flight
would touch down with two hours of fuel
remaining. Not a critical issue for
Simplexity
Aloft.
0645 PLEASE TAKE BEARING
ON US AND REPORT IN HALF HOUR / I WILL
MAKE NOISE IN MICROPHONE -- ABOUT 100 MILES
OUT.
Thirty
minutes later, right on schedule, the
message received at 0645
IST would have been
initiated by AE at 1815 GCT.
The
phrase "PLEASE TAKE
BEARING ON US" was
consistent with the 0615
IST transmission, as AE
continues to invoke Half-Duplex RDF,
obtaining guidance from the ground ('DF
steer'). At this point
sophisticated solvers are able to
identify another critical issue.
Critical
Issue {4}: No acknowledgment is
present in the transcript that AE had
received a bearing from Itasca
in response to her 1745 GCT request a
half- hour earlier.
It is
altogether reasonable that AE would have
said something to the effect "WE
RECEIVED YOUR TRANSMISSION, AS ADVISED WE
HAVE TAKEN UP A HEADING OF ZERO NINER ZERO."
Apparently
unknown to AE, the radio operators on
board Itasca did not have the
appropriate RDF equipment to take
bearings from AE's signals on the
frequency she was using, 3105
KCS. Of course,
the operator in the radio room would
have made no secret of that inability
during Itasca's transmitting
time-slot at 0630 IST, and therefore AE
should have received that unhappy news
at 1815 GCT or more likely
earlier. Accordingly, the absence
of an acknowledgement in critical issue
{4} provides indirect evidence of
something more general to concern us.
Critical
Issue {5}: Transmissions from Itasca
on 3105 KCS cannot be received by
the Electra. Not knowing that, AE
goes ahead and tries again.
With her
request recorded at 0645
IST, we observe the
gratuitous phrase "REPORT IN
HALF HOUR" not "REPORT ON
HALF HOUR." This could be the result of
a transcription error, of course; however, we
must characterize it as a critical
issue in our solution.
Critical
Issue {6}: On
board Itasca, "IN
HALF HOUR" means transmitting the RDF
response at 0715 IST, which is at
the beginning of the Electra's next
transmission slot and a violation of the
pre-arranged radio schedule. If AE
really said. "ON HALF HOUR,"
the RDF response from Itasca would
not be transmitted until 0730 IST,
which is delayed a full 45 minutes.
Another interpretation of the
issue may be supported by the absence of AE's
1845 GCT transmission,
implying that, she indeed meant "IN"
not "ON," an apparent ad
hoc adjustment to the radio protocol
that invited Itasca to transmit in her
time-slot.
For unknowable reasons, AE
changed from "WILL WHISTLE IN MIC"
to "I WILL MAKE NOISE IN MICROPHONE,"
possible on the assumption that her attempt
a half-hour earlier had failed. If so,
AE may have also decided to allow more time
for the RDF to be processed.
The estimate "ABOUT 100
MILES OUT" at 1815
GCT would be doubtful,
given previous estimate of "ABOUT TWO
HUNDRED MILES OUT" only thirty
minutes earlier at 1745
GCT. Solvers of the Wages of Flight
puzzle will probably not classify this
is a critical issue for Simplexity Aloft.
0742 KHAQQ CALLING ITASCA
WE MUST BE ON YOU BUT CANNOT SEE YOU BUT GAS
IS RUNNING LOW UNABLE REACH YOU BY RADIO WE
ARE FLYING AT ALTITUDE 1000 FEET.
The most mysterious attribute
of AE's transmission at 1912 GCT
(0742 IST) is that it came over the
air almost a full hour after her previous
transmission, having skipped her
transmission scheduled for 1845 GCT (0715
IST) and taking up part of
the time interval assigned to Itasca for
transmitting.
Critical
Issue {7}: The simple fact that
the message was logged in the Itasca
radio room at 0742
IST means that operators in
the radio room were listening not
transmitting on 3105
KCS during
the time slot assigned to Itasca.
The urgency for AE
to get back on the radio is implied by the
wishful message, "WE
MUST BE ON YOU BUT CANNOT SEE YOU." No mention is
made of clouds or limited visiblity.
Still, the passage raises the question,
Why did AE wait for an extra half-hour
before calling?
A
speculative answer may be present in the
sentence "WE ARE
FLYING AT ALTITUDE 1000 FEET," which suggests that
AE may have been distracted from radio
direction finding while engaged in the
descent from cruise altitude (possibly
through a cloud deck).
Here
again, we see evidence of the most
serious difficulty faced by AE in the
phrase, "UNABLE REACH
YOU BY RADIO"
(see critical issue{5} above).
The
fuel consumption rate was higher than
planned as the result of realities that
will be well understood by solvers of Live Reckoning.
Nevertheless, less than 20 hours
earlier, the electra had taken off with
22 hours of fuel on board. AE's
worrisome statement "GAS
IS RUNNING LOW"
probably does not qualify as a critical
issue for our solution to Simplexity Aloft. It is not too
unlikely that AE was trying by those
words to intensify the pressure on the
radio operators on board Itasca.
Either that or she was just thinking out
loud.
0758 KHAQQ CALLING ITASCA
-- WE ARE CIRCLING BUT CANNOT HEAR YOU GO
AHEAD ON 7500 EITHER NOW OR ON THE SCHEDULE
TIME ON HALF HOUR.
The
transcript logged this message at 0758
IST or 1928 GCT -- just two
minutes before the end of AE's time slot
for transmitting and 16 minutes after the
previous transmission, which had 'stepped
on' Itasca's transmission
schedule. Whether these times are correct
we cannot know. More than confusion
is in play. Specifically, there
needed to be extra intervals of radio
silence on board Itasca to allow
operators to listen for transmissions from
AE on board the inbound Electra.
Almost certainly
the statement "WE ARE
CIRCLING BUT CANNOT HEAR YOU" was taken down in
error. "Circling" does not make
sense according do Gillespie.
Instead
the passage should have been corrected
to read "WE ARE LISTENING
BUT CANNOT HEAR YOU."
If
so, that is a devastating reminder of
critical issue {5} above.
The
next request "GO AHEAD
ON 7500"
indicates a peremptory change in
frequency by Amelia Earhart and another
source of confusion.
Critical
Issue {8}: The "go ahead" could
refer to the frequency for listening by
Itasca to hear audio "noise"
(formerly "whistling"), but "go ahead"
could more likely refer the frequency
for Itasca to use in responding
with the RDF bearing.
The
request includes "EITHER
NOW OR ON THE SCHEDULE TIME ON HALF HOUR," whereby "now" would be
at 0758 IST, which is two minutes
before "the schedule time," but that would
be "on the hour" 0800
IST as read on Itasca
clocks not the "half hour" 1930 GCT as
seen by AE on board the Electra. Nom
et ipsa, this part of the
transmission by itself would not
indicate a critical issue, inasmuch as two
minutes later AE called again on 3105
KCS -- stepping on another
time-slot assigned to Itasca.
0800 KHAQQ CALLING ITASCA
WE RECEIVED YOUR SIGNALS BUT UNABLE TO GET A
MINIMUM PLEASE TAKE BEARING ON US AND ANSWER
3105 WITH VOICE.
For the
first time AE is able to say "WE
RECEIVED YOUR SIGNALS"
(presumably on the new frequency 7500
KCS). Notice that's
"signals" not necessarily "words" or
"voice." Itasca was able to
send only code on 7500
KCS. By
pre-arrangement before the flight, Morse
Code for the letter "A" (dot-dash) was to
be repeated over and over, intended to
surmount critical issue {3} and enable
Receive-Only RDF.
One
resource, TIGHAR,
offers an intriguing explanation for the
loss of radio reception on board
the Electra and thus RDF . As
indicated in the cutaway diagram below,
supposedly a "belly antenna" was needed
for receiving radio
communications. Film evidence has
been discovered
suggesting that the antenna was torn off
during the take-off roll at Lae.
Other experts, especially Rafford,
say instead that the V-antenna on the
mast atop the aircraft was used for both
sending and receiving. Let us take
AE's 1930 GCT transmission, which
included the passage, "WE
RECEIVED YOUR SIGNALS," as confirmation.
The
full sentence "WE
RECEIVED YOUR SIGNALS BUT UNABLE TO GET A
MINIMUM"
implies that AE had suddenly switched
from Half-Duplex RDF and was attempting
to accomplish Receive-Only RDF, which
calls for receiving the 7500
KCS signal using the
Electra's loop antenna "to get a
minimum" for a bearing.
Solvers will note
that only two minutes had elapsed (0758
- 0800 IST) since
AE's request to GO
AHEAD ON 7500 --
only two minutes to GET
A MINIMUM on a
different frequency (7500
KCS,changing
from
3105 KCS).
Critical
Issue {9}: Amelia Earhart failed
to achieve Receive-Only RDF.
Apparently
unknown to -- or unremembered by -- Amelia
Earhart, the loop antenna aboard the
Electra was designed for 'low frequencies'
-- 250 to 500 KCS not 7500 KCS, as
explained by Paul Rafford and others. An
endless string of dot-dashes (not a DF
steer by Morse Code) would have been
useless on board the Electra.
AE
returns to Half-Duplex RDF with the
statement "PLEASE TAKE
BEARING ON US AND ANSWER 3105 WITH VOICE." The dire truth:
Half-Duplex RDF had not worked for more
than two hours; there was no reason to
expect it would work now. Or ever.
0843 WE ARE ON THE LINE OF
POSITION 157-337, WILL REPEAT THIS MESSAGE,
WE WILL REPEAT THIS MESSAGE ON 6210
KCS. WAIT LISTENING ON 6210 KCS. . .
WE ARE RUNNING NORTH AND SOUTH.
Parsing
Amelia Earhart's last transmission at 0843
IST (2013 GCT)...
WE ARE ON THE LINE
OF POSITION 157-337 ~~ An incomplete position
report, given that the sun LOP
stretches both north and south of
Howland, then...
WILL REPEAT THIS
MESSAGE ~~ An
awkward redundancy, as it might have
pertained to 3105
KCS,
were it not interrupted by...
WE WILL REPEAT THIS
MESSAGE ON 6210 KCS ~~ An abrupt change in
the Electra's frequency, which is
condradicted by its being transmitted
on 3105 KCS;
WAIT LISTENING ON
6210 KCS ~~ An
unnecessary request inasmuch as Itasca
would be transmitting on all
frequencies during its assigned
time-slot, and finally...
WE ARE RUNNING NORTH
AND SOUTH.~~ An
ambiguous -- indeed -- an impossible
flight maneuver and altogether useless
for guiding subsequent searches.
Some
authors (and I)
have speculated that the last line in
Amelia Earhart's last radio
transmission was transcribed in error
-- that she really said...
WE ARE RUNNING ON LINE
NORTH NOT SOUTH.
Critical
Issue {10}: Amelia Earhart was
woefully uninformed about the operation
of her radios both for navigating and
communicating. Or something
else...
For our solution to the Simplexity Aloft puzzle...
We have identified at
least ten critical issues
in Amelia Earhart's
six final radio transmissions.
...which taken together
provide more than enough causes for the
utter failure in radio communications during
the last two and a half hours of the
flight.
The expression "more than enough"
should raise suspicions. Arguably the
researcher with the best credentials, Paul
Rafford, Jr., has used evidence obtained
over seven decades from contemporaneous
sources for his own speculations in Amelia
Earhart’s Radio: Why She Disappeared.
Rafford suggests...
That the confusion in
Earhart's radio work was intentional.
That both simplex and
half-duplex RDF were deliberately
defeated.
That Earhart and Noonan
had a destination other than Howland.
That the Electra would
be concealed from all the inevitable
searches.
That Earhart and Noonan
would therefore not be immediately found.
Cynics might argue that the
whole round-the-world trip was a publicity
stunt and thus presumably augmented by a
massive deception, which went horribly
wrong. A more solemn motivation is
favored by many -- that Earhart and Noonan had
heroic
rôles to
play in the nation's run-up to World War II
in the Pacific. We will leave those
puzzles for others. Available to guide
such endeavors are huge amounts of speculative
literature, some considering -- but
most neglecting -- the technical and
historical findings which have been studied
in Simplexity Aloft.